Abstract. Arrow's Theorem, in its social choice function formulation, assumes that all nonempty finite subsets of the universal set of alternatives is potentially a feasible set. We demonstrate that the axioms in Arrow's Theorem, with weak Pareto strengthened to strong Pareto, are consistent if it is assumed that there is a prespecified alternative which is in every feasible set. We further show that if the collection of feasible sets consists of all subsets of alternatives containing a prespecified list of alternatives and if there are at least three additional alternatives not on this list, replacing nondictatorship by anonymity results in an impossibility theorem.
Introduction
Arrow's [2] Impossibility Theorem is usually expressed in terms of social welfare functions; a social welfare function assigns a social preference ordering to each admissible profile of individual orderings of a set of alternatives. The theorem, though, can also be expressed in terms of social choice functions. A social choice function does the following: for each set of alternatives that might turn out to be feasible, and for each admissible preference profile, a social choice function specifies a nonempty subset of the feasible set -the choice set. The use of a social choice function thus' requires a specification of which subsets of the universal set of alternatives are potential feasible sets: In the standard choice-theoretic versions of Arrow's Theorem, the collection of feasible sets consists of all nonempty finite subsets (or at least all two and three element subsets) of the set of alternatives. Given this domain assumption, Arrow's Theorem states that no social choice function with an unrestricted preference domain satisfies all of (i) the Arrow [1] choice axiom, (ii) independence of (preferences involving) infeasible alternatives, (iii) weak Pareto, and (iv) nondictatorship.
The usual proofs of Arrow's Theorem rely heavily on the assumption that any pair of alternatives is a possible feasible set, i. e. any two alternatives might turn out to be the only feasible alternatives. Bailey [3] questions the relevence of Arrow's domain assumption, and thus question; the relevance of Arrow's Theorem, for problems involving the design of economic institutions. In an economic problem, feasible sets might be known in advance, say, to take the following form: a feasible set consists of all of the allocations attainable given a particular specification of the state of technical knowledge and the initial endowment of resources. Such feasible sets typically contain an infinite number of alternatives and, thus, do not satisfy Arrow's domain assumption mentioned above. In a similar vein, Richelson [14] argues that in many political decision-making contexts, not all finite subsets of the universal set are potentially feasible. In particular, he notes that in many situations there is a status quo alternative which is in every feasible set. It may be worthwhile, then, to consider the sensitivity of Arrow's Theorem to alternative specifications of the collection of feasible sets. Previous work on this topic has been rather limited. Grether and Plott [6] consider what they call k-set feasibility. With k-set feasibility, the collection of feasible sets consists of all finite subsets of alternatives containing at least k alternatives. They demonstrate that Arrow's axioms are inconsistent with this collection of feasible sets ifk is strictly less than the total number of alternatives. 1 Donaldson and Weymark [5] , motivated by economic problems, restrict attention to feasible sets which are compact subsets of a Euclidean space and contain an infinite number of alternatives. By placing natural economic restrictions on preferences and on feasible sets of alternatives, they demonstrate that Arrow's other axioms are consistent with these domain assumptions.
In the present article we explore the implications for social choice theory of having every potential feasible set contain a prespecified list of alternatives. This restriction on the collection of feasible sets is satisfied, for example, if there is a status quo alternative which is always available. 2 Similarly, this restriction is satisfied if there is a fixed alternative, not necessarily the status quo, which is adopted if no agreement is reached on the choice of another alternative, as in many bargaining situations: In many institutional settings, the rules of order require that one alternative -the motion -and (often implicitly) the status quo are always under consideration. In this example, every potential feasible set contains two fixed alternatives?
We demonstrate that the axioms in Arrow's Theorem, with weak Pareto strengthened to strong Pareto, are consistent if the assumption that the feasible set domain is unrestricted is replaced by the assumption that there is a prespecified list See Grether and Plott [6] for a discussion of earlier related contributions. Panda [12, 13] extends a number of social choice theorems from an unrestricted feasible set domain to k-set feasibility. 2 Richelson [14] provides a number of illustrations of this phenomenon. 3 We are indebted to Bernie Grofman for suggesting this example.
of alternatives which are always feasible. We do not have a complete characterization of the class of social choice functions which satisfy Arrow's axioms with this domain restriction. However, we are able to demonstrate that any member of this class of functions must exhibit some dictatorial features if the collection of feasible sets consists of all subsets of alternatives containing the prespecified list of alternatives and if there are at least three additional alternatives not on this list. Furthermore, with this strengthened domain restriction, we find that replacing nondictatorship by anonymity results in an impossibility theorem.
Notation, Definitions, and Background Results
There is a finite set of individuals M= {1,..., m} where m > 2 and a universal set of alternatives X containing a finite number n _> 3 of elements. Each individual has a In other words, the choice set C(S, (Ri)) is the set of most preferred elements in S according to the social preference ordering F((Ri)):
We consider feasible set domains which have a special property: every feasible set contains a fixed set Q of alternatives.
Q-Restricted Feasible Set Domain. For QcX with Q~O, SESP~Q~S.
Suppose, for example, as in many contexts, there is a status quo alternative Y which is always feasible, then this condition is satisfied with Q = {y}. When Q = {~}, we write Y-restricted instead of {:~}-restricted. For 04:QcQ'cX, if 5 P is a Q '-restricted feasible set domain, then 5 a is also a Q-restricted feasible set domain: Thus to say that every feasible set contains the set of alternatives Q does not rule out the possibility that every feasible set contains some superset Q' of Q.
A Q-restricted feasible set domain need not include every subset of Xcontaining Q, so it is possible for distinct collections of feasible sets ,9 ° and 5 P' both to be Q-restricted feasible set domains. The collection of all subsets of X containing Q is called the complete Q-restricted feasible set domain.
Complete Q-Restricted Feasible Set Domain. For Q c X with Q =~ 0, S e 5p+--,Q c S.
The complete Q-restricted feasible set domain is not a Q '-restricted feasible set domain for any Q'~X such that QcQ' and Q+Q'. Richelson [14] works with a complete Y-restricted feasible set domain.
We shall have occasion to consider a preference domain which consists of all profiles satisfying two properties: (i) everyone prefers the alternatives not in Q to the alternatives in Q and (ii) for all admissible profiles, each person has a single ranking of the alternatives in Q, where Q is a fixed set of alternatives. We denote the restriction of a preference profile (Ri) e ~" to Q ~ X by (Ri)Q.
Q-Minimal Preference Domain.
For Q c X with Q =t= 0 and for (Ri) e N", 9-= {(Ri) e¢~ m] (i) for all ieM, xPiy for all xeX\Q and for all y~Q and (ii) <R~>~ = <~> Q}.
When Q = {2}, we write X-minimal instead of {:?}-minimal. There is only one Y-minimal preference domain as the second defining property of a Q-minimal preference domain is trivially satisfied if Q={2}. If #Q_>2, there are many Q-minimal preference domains; each differs in the way individuals rank the alternatives in Q.
The remainder of the conditions we consider in our theorems are standard in the literature.
Unrestricted Feasible Set Domain. Y = ~(X)\O.
Unrestricted Preference Domain. 9=~ ~.
Arrow's Choice Axiom. For all S, S'e5 r, for all (Ri)eg, if S c S' and if C(S', (R~)) m S :# 0, then C(S, (R~)) = C(S', (R~)) m S. ~ Independence of Infeasible Alternatives. For all S e 5 P, for all (Ri), (R') e 9, if xR~y+-+xR/y for all ieM and for all x, yeS, then C(S, (Ri))= C(S, (R[)).
Weak Pareto. For all S e 5 ~, for all (Ri)e 9, if x, y e S and if xPiy for all i e M, then y ¢ C(S, (Ri)).
Strong Pareto. For all S e 5 e, for all (R~) e 9, if x, y e S and ifxR~ y for all i e M with xPzy for some ieM, then y¢C(S, (Rg)).
Nondictatorship. There does not exist aj~ M such that for all S e 5 °, for all (Ri) E 9, C(S, (Ri))c {x~SlxRjy for all yeS}. For an unrestricted feasible set domain, the social welfare function which rationalizes a social choice function that satisfies Arrow's choice axiom is unique, and is determined from the choices made out of the two-element feasible sets. For a complete Q-restricted feasible set domain, not all two-element subsets of X can be feasible and, in general, more than one social welfare function may rationalize a given social choice function which satisfies Arrow's choice axiom.
Anonymity. For all SeSZ, for all (Ri), (R[) eg, if (R') is a permutation of the orderings in (Ri), then C(S, (Ri)) = C(S, (R:)).

Results
Our possibility theorem states that the axioms in Arrow's Theorem, with weak Pareto strengthened to strong Pareto, are consistent if the assumption that the feasible set domain is unrestricted is replaced by the assumption that the feasible set domain is 2-restricted] Hence, regardless of the value of m (> 2), C'~ (S, (Ri)) = {2 }, which contradicts the assumption thatj is a dictator. Asj is arbitrary, this argument establishes that ~m is nondictatorial: [] The social choice function ~m used to prove Theorem 1 can be thought of as operating in a series of steps. First, the social choice function ~R is constructed. If not all choice sets are singletons, a tie-breaking rule is introduced yielding the social choice function ~o. New tie-breaking rules are then applied sequentially until the process is terminated with ~m:
The social choice function (7 R was introduced by Richelson [14] . N + (x, {Ri)) is the number of people who strictly prefer x to 2 in the profile (Ri) and, similarly, N-(x, {Ri)) is the number of people who strictly prefer 2 to x: If, for a given profile (Ri), each individual assigns one point to each alternative preferred to 2, zero points to alternatives indifferent to 2, and negative one point to alternatives judged to be worse than 2, then N(x, (R~)) is the total number of points received by x. For a given preference profile {Rz) and feasible set S, Richelson's social choice function ~R chooses the alternatives which receive the highest number of points in S. The first tie-breaking rule retains only those alternatives among the ones chosen in the first stage which make the fewest number of people worse off compared to 2. Finally, a serial dictatorship is used to further narrow the remaining alternatives.
While ~R by itself satisfies many desirable properties, Richelson demonstrates that ~a does not satisfy weak Pareto if there exists an S~5~ with #S_>3. 9 For example, if everyone prefers z to y to 2, then both y and z would be chosen out of {~, y, z}, but z Pareto dominates y: It is for this reason that the serial dictatorship is introduced as a tie-breaking rule: A simple dictatorship would be sufficient if we merely required our social choice function to satisfy weak Pareto; the serial dictatorship is adopted to ensure that our function satisfies strong Pareto.
The second step in our example is not essential when m > 2 or if there exists an S ~ ~ with # S > 3. If this step is omitted, person one is a dictator if m = 2 and # S < 2 for all S e 5 ~. More generally, this tie-breaking rule limits the scope of the nonanonymous part of our social choice function.
Because of the use of a serial dictatorship as a tie-breaking rule, the social choice function (7 m is obviously unsatisfactory. Given the domain conditions in Theorem 1, other social choice functions exist which satisfy the Arrow axioms, but they too have dictatorial features. I° For example, such a social choice function can be constructed by first, for any feasible set and admissible profile, restricting attention to 2 together with the set of feasible alternatives which Pareto dominate 2 and by then applying a serial dictatorship to these alternatives to yield the choice set. In this example, each person has the power to veto any alternative which he or she judges to be worse than 2, but the tie-breaking rule is again dictatorial. If the feasible set domain 5 e is {£, )5} -restricted, the preference domain ~ can be partitioned into m subsets with the property that if two profiles coincide on {2, 35}, then they are both in the same 9 Richelson also considers a modified version of ~,R which satisfies weak Pareto. It is easy to verify that this modified social choice function violates Arrow's choice axiom. lo Formal details of the following examples are included in an earlier draft of this article which appeared as Discussion Paper No. 85-15, Department of Economics, University of British Columbia. element of the partition. For each element of the partition, a different serial dictatorship is used to determine the choice sets. By assigning each person to be the first "'dictator" for one of the elements of the partition, a social choice function constructed according to this procedure spreads the power to make collective decisions throughout society. Clearly, such rules are not anonymous.
All of our examples exhibit some dictatorial features. Theorem 2 demonstrates that this state of affairs is inevitable with a complete Q-restricted feasible set domain and a Q-minimal preference domain (or any larger preference domain) provided there are at least three alternatives in X not in Q.
Theorem 2. Ira social choice function has a complete Q-restricted feasible set domain and a Q-minimal preference domain and if # Q + 3 <_ # X, then it can no t satisfy all of (i) Arrow's choice axiom, (ii) independence of infeasible alternatives, (iii) weak Pareto, and (iv) nondictatorship.
Proof On the contrary, assume such a social choice function exists. By assumption T: =X\Q contains at least three distinct alternatives. Let (Ri)r, 9r, N~', St, and 5P r denote the restrictions of (Ri), 9, N", S, and 5e, respectively, to the set T. Since 9 is a Q-minimal preference domain, 9r=~', i.e. Nr is an unrestricted preference domain on T. Since 5" is a complete Q-restricted feasible set domain, 5e r is an unrestricted feasible set domain on T. Define the social choice function C* : Yr x ~ (T) by setting C* (St, (Ri)r) : = C(S, (Ri)) for all S ~ 5 P and for all (R~) ~ 9. Since C satisfies weak Pareto and 9 is a Q-minimal preference domain, C* is a well-defined social choice function on T with an unrestricted feasible set domain and an unrestricted preference domain. It is easy to confirm that C* satisfies (i) Arrow More generally, suppose X contains at least three alternatives not in Q and a social choice function C satisfies Arrow's choice axiom, independence of infeasible alternatives, and weak Pareto with a complete Q-restricted feasible set domain. If 9 contains two or more Q-minimal preference domains, C must be dictatorial when restricted to each Q-minimal preference domain, but the dictator can be made conditional on the individual rankings of the alternatives in Q.
With an unrestricted preference domain and a complete Q-restricted feasible set domain, an immediate consequence of Theorem 2 is that an impossibility theorem is obtained if the axioms in Theorem I are strengthened by replacing nondictatorship with anonymity provided that there are at least three alternatives in X not in Q. For example, if everyone prefers Y to both y and z, the social ranking of y and z is arbitrary. However, with these assumptions, if the preference domain is the Y-minimal preference domain Ng, the underlying social welfare function does satisfy partial independence of irrelevant alternatives, which on this domain is equivalent to independence of irrelevant alternatives. With weak Pareto, 2 is never chosen, and the social ranking of y, z E X is uniquely determined from the choice set of {Y, y, z}, which is independent of preferences involving infeasible alternatives.
With a finite number of alternatives there is no loss of generality in assuming that the individual preference orderings are representable by utility functions. A social welfare functional maps profiles of utility functions on X into ~, the set of orderings of X. 12 In the Arrow problem, individual utilities are ordinalIy measurable and interpersonally noncomparable: This assumption concerning the measurability and comparability of utilities is formalized by requiring the social welfare functional to be invariant with respect to independent monotone increasing transforms of the utility functions, i.e. if two profiles of utility functions represent the same profile of individual orderings, the functional must map both profiles into the same social ordering. In this framework, the independence conditions can be reformulated without any implicit assumptions concerning the information content of the utility functions. A social welfare functional satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives if the social rankings of any set of alternatives A c X corresponding to two profiles of utility functions are identical whenever each alternative x e A is assigned the same vector of utility numbers by both profiles. Similarly, partial independence of irrelevant alternatives with respect to 2 is satisfied if the social rankings of any set of alternatives A c X are identical whenever each alternative x e A w {2 } is assigned the same vector of utility numbers by both profiles. These conditions are equivalent to their counterparts for social welfare functions if the social welfare functional is invariant to independent monotone increasing transforms of the utility functions.
Requiring a social welfare functional to be invariant with respect to independent positive affine transforms of the utility functions corresponds to the assumption that individual utility functions are cardinally measurable and interpersonally noncomparable. Unlike in the ordinal context, with this information assumption, if all admissible utility profiles represent preferences in Ng, partial independence of irrelevant alternatives is not equivalent to independence of irrelevant alternatives; for sets of alternatives A ~ X\{2} the actual utility numbers assigned to 2, not just the utility numbers assigned to elements of A, matter in determining the social ordering of A.
For cardinally measurable and interpersonally noncomparable utility functions, Roberts [15, Theorem 7] for all x, y ~ X\{£} and for all profiles of utility functions (U1,..., U m) satisfying the domain restriction, provided #X_>4. *a It is a simple matter to extend Roberts' theorem to the ordinal context: If the social welfare functional must be invariant to ordinal, and not just cardinal, transforms of the utility functions, only one of the a~ can be positive; i. e. there must be a dictator. This result is a social welfare functional analogue to Theorem 2 for Q = {2}. Adding anonymity to Roberts' assumptions implies that the a~ in (*) must all be equal, and without loss of generality they can be set equal to one. Thus Roberts has obtained an axiomatization of a social welfare functional which rationalizes the Nash [10] bargaining solution.14 The rankings of the alternatives obtained using (*) with each a~ equal to one are not invariant to ordinal transforms of the utility functions: This observation can be used to provide an alternative proof of our Theorem 3 with Q = {2}.
The conclusions to be drawn from our analysis are essentially negative. While it is possible to find social choice functions which satisfy all of Arrow's conditions when the preference domain is unrestricted and the feasible set domain is Q-restricted, all such rules must exhibit dictatorial features if the Q-restricted feasible set domain is complete.
13 Strictly speaking, Roberts works with an unrestricted preference domain and shows that (.) must apply when the functional is restricted "to preferences in Nx" 14 See also Kaneko [8] , Kaneko and Nakamura [9] , and Osborne [11] for related results.
